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The Women’s Preventative Services Provision of the ACA and For-Profit Corporations: 
Must They Comply? 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [hereinafter the ACA] was signed into 
law by President Obama on March 23, 2010.
1
  The ACA is the largest health reform legislation 
in decades and has the potential to provide healthcare coverage for many of the currently 
uninsured people in the United States as well as bring costs down for others who already have 
healthcare insurance.
2
  One of the key provisions of the ACA, and arguably the most 
controversial, is the Women’s Preventative Services Provision which includes a contraception 
coverage mandate for many types of group health insurance plans.
3
 
 The inclusion of the Women’s Preventative Services Provision [herein after the 
Provision] caused an uproar, especially among social and religious conservatives who claimed 
that the Provision violated their religious beliefs.  Almost immediately after its passage, lawsuits 
challenging different provisions of the ACA flooded into federal courts across the country.  
Many of these lawsuits focused on the alleged violation of employers’ religious beliefs stemming 
from the Provision.  This paper provides a detailed analysis of a selection of challenges against 
the Provision, focusing on for-profit employers’ Free Exercise Clause and Religious Freedom 
                                            
1
 42 U.S.C.A. § 18001 (2010). 
2
 Id.  
3
 Affordable Care Act Rule on Expanding Access to Preventive Services for Women. 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/08/ 
womensprevention08012011a.html. (last updated Feb. 1, 2013). 
 2 
Restoration Act [hereinafter RFRA] claims.  Plaintiffs in these cases are seeking an exemption 
from the Provision.  This paper examines the legislative and judicial history of the Free Exercise 
Clause and RFRA and how it applies to current challenges against the Provision.  Following the 
analysis, this paper advocates against exemptions from the Provision for for-profit employers 
and ultimately for all types of employers. 
 
 
Background 
 
 The congressional debate leading up to the ACA enactment was fraught with conflict, 
and the conflict did not end after the law was signed.  Many lawmakers and citizens questioned 
the constitutionality of some of the key, fundamental provisions of the ACA including the 
individual mandate
4
 and the Medicaid expansion
5
.  This lead to multiple cases of litigation
6
 
which culminated in the Supreme Court case National Federation of Independent Business v. 
                                            
4
 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (2010) (The individual mandate is a basic requirement for all individuals 
to maintain health insurance that, at minimum, covers essential health benefits as defined by the 
ACA.  The justification for the mandate is based on the effects individual health, in the 
aggregate, has on interstate commerce and the overall public health.  Increased access helping 
individuals obtain coverage is achieved through expanded coverage requirements for employer-
based insurance, a Medicaid expansion, and state exchanges); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A 
(2010) (If an individual does not maintain essential health benefits coverage, the individual is 
subject to a penalty); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (2010) (The ACA provides an option for 
states to establish exchanges.  Generally, the exchanges have the goal of providing competition 
within the individual insurance market, providing cost-saving benefits in a similar way as the 
group health insurance market by giving individuals the advantages of group purchasing power 
and provider competition.). 
5
 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396c (2010). (The ACA included a provision that would expand Medicaid 
eligibility to more people, with the goal of expanding health coverage access, especially for low-
income people); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) 
(The Medicaid Expansion was not upheld in full because it had the condition that states must 
comply or risk losing all Medicaid funding.). 
6
 Nat’l Fed’n, supra note 5, at 2572 (This case was originally brought in Federal District Court 
and challenged the constitutionality of the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Medicaid expansion 
provision but not the individual mandate.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.). 
 3 
Sebelius brought by twenty-six different states as well as private individuals and a business 
organization against Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
7
 
 In an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court upheld the individual 
mandate under Congress’ taxing power and held there could no penalization for states refusing to 
participate in the Medicaid expansion.
8
  Because the penalization provision was ruled severable 
from the Medicaid expansion itself, the ACA was effectively upheld as constitutional, and 
implementation proceeded.
9
  Implementation of the ACA is gradual with different provisions 
becoming effective each year to allow a more functional transition.  Some of the earliest 
provisions to take effect involved allowing young adults to stay on their parent’s insurance plan 
until the age of twenty-six and prohibiting lifetime limits on insurance coverage.
10
  By 2014, 
many individual consumers who do not have insurance through employment will be able to shop 
for insurance through state exchanges, lowering the cost for individuals by creating a separate 
marketplace.
11
   
 One of the most important provisions of the ACA is the Provision.  The Provision 
requires all new private health plans to cover eight different categories of preventative health 
services without cost-sharing including, “all Food and Drug Administration approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling as 
prescribed by a health care provider.”12  The fact that the Provision applies to all new private 
                                            
7
 Id. at 2572. 
8
 Id. at 2607. 
9
 Id. at 2608. 
10
 What’s Changing and When, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/law/timeline/ 
index.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2013). 
11
 Id. 
12
 Affordable Care Act Rules on Expanding Access to Preventive Services for Women, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/08/womensprevention 
08012011a.html (last updated Feb. 1, 2013). 
 4 
health plans means that private employers’ group health plans are subject to compliance 
beginning with the enrollment of new plans after August 1, 2012.
13
  Certain religious employers, 
described as  “tax-exempt organizations whose mission is the teaching of religious values 
primarily to members of their own faith through employees of their own faith,” are exempt from 
the provision.
14
   
While the debate continues as to who exactly qualifies for an exemption, a key factor is 
an employer’s status as a non-profit. 15   There are no exemptions proposed for for-profit 
corporations.  This paper does not advocate for any exemptions from the Provision, but it is clear 
how churches or other organizations with a specifically religious purpose may feel entitled to 
make Free Exercise or RFRA claims regarding the mandates of the Provision. However, for-
profit corporations do not have this same entitlement because of their inherently secular nature 
and profit-seeking mission.  Therefore, despite the continuously increasing amount of litigation 
being pursued against the Provision from all types of employers, this paper focuses on the claims  
  
                                            
13
 Id.  For example, the new requirements are triggered when employees are hired and enrolled in 
the employer-based health insurance after August 1, 2012.  The requirements are triggered for 
existing employees in any insurance enrollment period on or after August 1, 2012. 
14
 FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, WITH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY FOR ALL: A DEFENSE OF THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S CONTRACEPTION COVERAGE MANDATE 3 (American 
Constitution Society, Oct. 2012). 
15
 Women’s Preventative Services Coverage and Religious Organizations, CCIIO, 
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/factsheets/womens-preven-02012013.html (last visited Apr. 27, 
2012). 
 5 
of for-profit corporations.
16
 
 Some owners of for-profit corporations feel they should also be able to claim exemption 
from the Provision, and they have brought litigation seeking injunctions from the enforcement of 
the provision.  Most of the litigation is based on claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment and RFRA.  The purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to protect religious 
liberty from being prohibited by the government.  The neutrality and generality of the law in 
question determines the appropriate level of scrutiny meaning, “ a law that is both neutral and 
generally applicable need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest to survive 
a constitutional challenge.”17  Conversely, “if a law that burdens religious practice is not neutral 
or generally applicable, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and the burden on religious conduct 
violates the Free Exercise Clause unless it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling 
governmental interest.” 18  
 The history of Free Exercise litigation guides First Amendment interpretation and the 
development of other law based on religious liberty.  One of the most important cases in Free 
                                            
16
 Overview of the Lawsuits Challenging the Affordable Care Act’s No Cost-Sharing 
Contraceptive Coverage Benefit, NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, 
http://www.nwlc.org/overview-lawsuits-challenging-affordable-care-act%E2%80%99s-no-cost-
sharing-contraceptive-coverage-benefit (last visited Apr. 27, 2013). This paper focuses on 
lawsuits brought by for-profit corporations, but litigation is also being pursued by non-profits.  
According to the National Women’s Law Center, as of April, 2013, there have been sixty-one 
different lawsuits challenging the Provision; thirty-three of those have been brought by non-
profit organizations whereas twenty-eight lawsuits have been brought by for-profit corporations.  
Because many non-profit organizations qualify for a safe harbor, meaning they have a year 
allowing non-compliance with the Provision before enforcement begins, many of those cases 
have been dismissed because of standing and ripeness issues. 
17
 Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 (10th Cir. 2006). 
18
 Id. at 649; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. Inc. v. City of Hialieah, 508 U.S. 520, 
546 (1993) (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application 
must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.  To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a 
law restrictive of religious practice must advance ‘interests of the highest order’ and must be 
narrowly tailored.”). 
 6 
Exercise history is Wisconsin, a case involving an Amish group claiming they should be entitled 
to an exemption from the state requirement of school attendance until the age of sixteen.
19
  The 
court found that the government did have a compelling interest in educating citizens, but 
balanced that interest with the Amish, religiously-based way of life finding that the Amish 
education system had measurable value, leading to the conclusion that the Amish system would 
not only contribute to the overall government goal of educating citizens but also would have 
little effect on altering that goal.
20
  As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s 
finding that the Amish group was entitled to an exemption from the state school attendance 
requirement.
21
 
 While this case seemed like a victory for religious exemptions from state law, the 
Supreme Court has not always ruled in favor of religious groups claiming a Free Exercise 
violation.  In a controversial opinion, the Supreme Court in Smith ruled in favor of the 
government in a dispute about firing employees for misconduct due to religious use of peyote at 
work.
22
  The court focused on the difference between a law targeting a specific religious practice 
and a law that was generally applicable, with Justice Scalia’s opinion emphasizing, “we have 
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise 
valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate”.23  It followed that since the law 
                                            
19
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
20
 Id. at 212-14; see also GEDICKS, supra note 14, at 16-17. 
21
 Wisconsin. 406 U.S. at 236. 
22
 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. Of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
23
 Id. 878-79; see also THOMAS C. BERG, THE FIRST AMENDMENT THE FREE EXERCISE OF 
RELIGION CLAUSE: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 
61-63 (2008). 
 7 
prohibiting use of peyote was generally applicable and validly neutral, the plaintiffs could not be 
exempt from compliance, and their Free Exercise claim failed.
24
 
 The Smith decision left many religious groups feeling vulnerable about the direction of 
Free Exercise Clause litigation.
25
  By emphasizing the compelling interest of the government, 
groups felt the Supreme Court was, “exposing religious conduct to generally applicable laws, it 
seemed to threaten core religious exercise in countless situations…”26  These implications served 
as the impetus for religious and civil-liberties groups to join together and lobby Congress for 
more assurance for the protection of religious liberty.
27
  These efforts resulted in the enactment 
of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA).
28
   
RFRA is a federal law that is targeted at emphasizing the role of the government showing 
a compelling interest in a law that burdens religious practice.
29
 RFRA forbids government from, 
“substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability unless the government demonstrates that application of the burden to the 
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”30 RFRA was originally intended to 
apply both to state and federal government, but in City of Boerne the court found that Congress 
exceeded its enforcement powers enacting RFRA by overriding statue and local law, saying that 
only the Court could delineate the rights within the Constitution.
31
  RFRA has since been 
                                            
24
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
25
 BERG, supra note 23, at 19. 
26
 Id. at 19. 
27
 Id. at 20. 
28
 Id; see also 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (1993). 
29
 BERG, supra note 23, at 19-20. 
30
 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(a), (b) (1993). 
31
 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also BERG. supra note 23, at 20. 
 8 
amended to apply only to federal law.
32
  Because the ACA is a federal law, it is permissible for 
owners of for-profit corporations to bring litigation claims under RFRA.   
  
Current Cases 
 The Supreme Court and United States Courts of Appeals have yet to address the merits of 
whether or not for-profit corporations may claim exemptions from the Provision under Free 
Exercise Clause or RFRA arguments; several Federal Districts Courts and United States Courts 
of Appeals have heard cases seeking injunctions against the provision with varying results.
33
   
Because the cases are at the procedural stage of seeking a preliminary injunction, the holdings 
are not the final rulings on the merits.  In deciding whether or not to grant a preliminary 
injunction, courts are generally weighing the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits 
along with other factors.
34
  Plaintiffs are aware that litigation could continue for years, so they 
                                            
32
 Flores, 521 U.S. at 532. 
33
 Overview. supra note 16. According to data from the National Women’s Law Center, there 
have been twenty-eight cases brought by for-profit corporations challenging the Provision.  Of 
those, only one has reached the merits, in the government’s favor in district court, but it is 
pending appeal.  Six cases have resulted in a denial for any temporary relief from the Provision, 
and eighteen cases have resulted in some form of temporary relief, meaning a preliminary 
injunction or stay pending appeal.  The United States Courts of Appeals have not reached the 
merits of any of these cases, and the Supreme Court has denied a request for an emergency 
injunction but has not yet reached any further analysis on the issue.  
34
 There is a four part test for whether a preliminary injunction should be granted which includes   
 
1) whether the plaintiff will probably succeed on the merits; 2) whether 
irreparable harm to the plaintiff would result if the injunction is not granted; 3) the 
balance of harms between the plaintiff and defendant if the injunction is allowed; 
an 4) whether the injunction will have an impact on the public interest. 
 
U.S. Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow, The Motion for A Preliminary Injunction: Time for a 
Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 497-98 (2003).  However, some courts weigh 
the factors differently or do not include all four factors in their analysis.  Id. at 498; see also 
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (The four factors 
provide a flexible, relative test where “no single factor is determinative.”). 
 9 
are simply seeking relief for compliance with the Provision while litigation proceeds and before 
a final ruling is held.  One of the most publicized of these cases is O’Brien v. U.S. Dept. of 
Health & Human Services.
35
  This involved the Catholic owner of a mining company, O’Brien 
Industrial Holdings, LLC. (OIH), bringing action for injunctive relief against the Provision.
36
  
O’Brien claimed compliance with the provision was against his religious belief and 
impermissibly violates the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA.
37
   
 O’Brien argued that his religious beliefs are extended to his corporation, and that under 
the holding of Citizens United, his corporation has religious liberties in the same manner as he 
does in his capacity as an individual.
38
  In regards to O’Brien’s RFRA claim, the court did not 
focus on whether or not a corporation has religious beliefs; it focused on the weight of the 
burden on the exercise of religion.
39
  The court cited Midrash Sephardi, Inv. v. Town of Surfside, 
defining a substantial burden as one that “place[s] more than an inconvenience on religious 
exercise; a substantial burden is akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious 
adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly” on the exercise of religion.40  Using this 
definition as guidance, the court did not find the provision to substantially burden OIH’s 
hypothetical religious beliefs because OIH can still avoid participation in using preventative 
services while subsidizing the services for other employees.
41
   
                                            
35
 O’Brien v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Service, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012), 
stay granted, No. 12-3357 (8
th
 Cir. Nov. 28, 2012). 
36
 Id. at 1150. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. at 1154; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43 (2010) 
(holding that corporations are entitled to First Amendment protection in the context of political 
speech). 
39
 O’Brien, 894 F.Supp. at 1157. 
40
 Id. at 1158, (citing Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11
th
 Cir. 
2004)). 
41
 Id. at 1159. 
 10 
Further, the court pointed out the incoherency of O’Brien’s RFRA claim noting that if 
subsidizing other employees’ choices to purchase contraception is a substantial burden on OIH’s 
religion, then the same argument could be made about paying OIH’s employees’ salaries because 
those dollars could then be used to purchase contraception.
42
  Emphasizing the indirect 
connection in O’Brien’s argument, the court noted, “RFRA is a shield, not a sword.  It protects 
individuals from substantial burdens on religious exercise that occur when the government 
coerces action one’s religion forbids, or forbids action one’s religion requires; it is not a means to 
force one’s religious practices upon others.”43 
 The court also rejected O’Brien’s Free Exercise argument because it found the provision 
to be facially neutral and generally applicable; thus, the appropriate standard of scrutiny is 
rational basis.
44
  Noting the secular nature of OIH as a for-profit corporate entity, the court found 
no need to analyze the facts of the supposed infringement on its religion.
45
  Further, the fact that 
employers who hold personal, individual religious beliefs were impacted by the provision does 
not mean that those employers were targeted by the provision.
46
  Based on these findings, the 
court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss O’Brien’s complaints.47  Following, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit heard O’Brien’s appeal.  In a somewhat unclear, 
one-sentence ruling, the Eight Circuit granted O’Brien’s stay pending appeal.48 The meaning of 
the Eight Circuit ruling and what will follow continues to develop. 
                                            
42
 Id. at 1160.    
43
 Id. at 1159. 
44
 O’Brien, 894 F.Supp. at 1160. 
45
 Id. at 1161. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
48
 O’Brien v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, No: 12-3357 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012). 
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 The case Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius involved the Hahn family, 
owners of a for-profit corporation, seeking an injunction against the provision based on Free 
Exercise and RFRA claims.
49
  The corporation manufactures wood cabinets, and the owners are 
practicing members of the Mennonite Christian religion.
50
  The plaintiffs argued that their 
religious beliefs extend to their corporation and cite Citizens United to support their claim that 
their individual Free Exercise Rights should extend to the identity of their corporation as a 
separate legal entity.
51
  However, the court noted that previous case law has separated “purely 
personal” freedoms from those that are extended to corporations.52  Further, neither Congress nor 
the Supreme Court has decided the nature of the Free Exercise Clause as it applies to 
corporations; thus, the court assigned the Free Exercise Clause a “purely personal” status.53   
 The court justifies its analysis of the Free Exercise Clause status for corporations by 
noting that the instances where the Free Exercise Clause has been extended to entities other than 
individuals have all involved religious organizations, not for-profit corporations which by their 
very nature are secular.
54
  As a separate legal entity, the corporation does not have the same 
religious rights as the individuals who own the corporation.
55
  The court adds that even if the 
Provision infringed upon the corporation’s hypothetical religious exercise, it would find the 
Provision neutral, generally applicable, and appropriately inclusive; thus, rational basis scrutiny 
would apply and the provision would be upheld.
56
   
                                            
49
  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6744, 2013 WL 140110 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
11, 2013), appeal docketed, No. 12-2673(6th Cir.). 
50
 Id. at *3. 
51
 Id. at *5, citing Citizens United, 558 U.S.  
52
 Id. at *6. 
53
 Id. at *5-6. 
54
 Conestoga, No.12-6744, at *6. 
55
 Id. at *8. 
56
 Id. at *8-9. 
 12 
 Plaintiffs also claimed the Provision violates their rights under RFRA.
57
  They based this 
claim on that fact that, as owners, they operate Conestoga Wood Specialties according to their 
religious beliefs; therefore, the provision substantially burdens the exercise of their religious 
beliefs that teach against use of contraceptives.
58
  The court found that it is not necessary to reach 
the materiality of whether or not the provision constitutes a substantial burden on the 
corporation’s religious belief because the corporation, as a separate legal entity from the owners, 
cannot freely exercise its own religious beliefs.
59
  In particular, the court noted that some 
limitations and regulations must result when plaintiffs chose to enter into the commercial 
marketplace with a for-profit corporation as opposed to choosing to make their corporation a 
non-profit with a religious identity.
60
  If a corporation wished to have the protections of a 
                                            
57
 Id. at *3. 
58
 Id. at *9. 
59
 Id. at *10. 
60
 The definition of a religious employer in regards to the Provision is still in flux.  According to 
the most recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the proposed qualifications for employers 
eligible for accommodations is defined as one that:  
 
1. opposes providing coverage for some or all of any contraceptive services 
required to be covered under Section 2713 of the PHS Act, on account of 
religious objection; 2. Is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity; 3. Holds 
itself out as a religious organization; and 4. self-certifies that it meet these criteria 
and specifies the contraceptive services for which it object to providing coverage.  
 
Saying an employer qualifies for an accommodation means that the employer itself does not have 
to provide coverage for contraceptives, but the employer’s employees would be provided with a 
separate contraceptive coverage plan, with no cost-sharing.  45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B).  
Exemptions from the Provision are already defined in a final rule and include houses of worship 
and churches.  Employers that qualify for an exemption are not subject to the requirement that 
employees have a separate plan for contraceptive coverage, as are the employers qualifying for 
an accommodation. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/01/health-reform-preventive-
services-and-religious-institutions. 
 13 
religious entity, it could have incorporated as a non-profit with a specifically religious mission 
instead of incorporating as a proprietary organization whose primary purpose is profit-seeking.
61
 
 The court continued that even if the corporation had separate religious liberties, the 
plaintiffs would have to show that there is not only a burden but also pass the threshold of 
showing a substantial burden on the exercise of those religious beliefs.
62
  The court did not find a 
showing of a substantial burden and noted that the provision does not even necessarily change 
whether or not employees use contraceptives stating, “it is worth emphasizing that the ultimate 
and deeply private choice to use an abortifacient contraceptive rests not with the Hahns, but with 
Conestoga’s employees.  The fact that Conestoga’s employees are free to look outside of their 
insurance coverage and pay for and use any contraception, including abortifacients, through the 
salary they receive from Conestoga, amply illustrates this point.”63  Further, the burden is too 
indirect to be considered substantial given the multi-step process an employee has to take in 
order to obtain a contraceptive or abortifacient, including seeing a doctor for a prescription and 
taking the prescription to a pharmacy, none of which involve the employers directly.
64
  Because 
plaintiffs did not show a likelihood for success of their Free Exercise, RFRA, and other claims, 
their motion for a preliminary injunction was denied.
65
 
 Following the District Court’s ruling, Conestoga sought a stay pending appeal in the 
Third Circuit.
66
  Noting the request for a stay pending appeal as an extreme remedy, the Third 
                                            
61
 Women’s Preventive Services. supra note 15 (noting the emphasis on a corporation’s status as 
non-profit in order to qualify for an accommodation). 
62
 Id. at *12-13. 
63
 Id. at *13. 
64
 Id. at *14. 
65
 Id. at *18. 
66
 Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, No. 
13-1144, 2013 WL 1277419 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2013). 
 14 
Circuit denied the motion.
67
  The Third Circuit followed the same analysis as the District Court 
and found the reasoning to be sound stating “because Plaintiffs failed to prove their likelihood of 
success on the merits, we DENY their request for extraordinary relief.”68 
 The Western District of Oklahoma made similar findings in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. 
Sebelius. Hobby Lobby is owned by the Green family who are practicing Christians, and they 
sought an injunction against the Provision claiming violations of religious liberty under the Free 
Exercise Clause, RFRA, and other law.
69
   In regards to the plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim, the 
court, in a similar analysis as Conestoga, found that secular, for-profit corporations do not enjoy 
the entirety of individual First Amendment rights and are excluded from those rights that are 
considered “purely personal.”70  The Greens may have had a stronger Free Exercise argument if 
Hobby Lobby Stores was a religious organization because Free Exercise rights are extended to 
religious organizations, but Hobby Lobby is a secular, for-profit corporation and not a religious 
organization.
71
  Because the court found that Free Exercise rights are not extended to Hobby 
Lobby, it did not go through the merits of the claim of a Free Exercise infringement and found 
this claim will likely fail.
72
 
 The plaintiffs also claimed the Provision violated the corporation’s religious liberty based 
on the ability for the corporation to have a separate exercise of religion from the owners.
73
  
However, the court found that Hobby Lobby, as a separate legal entity from its owners, does not 
                                            
67
 Id. at *2. 
68
 Id. at *3. 
69
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012). 
70
 Id. at 1287-88. 
71
 Id. at 1288. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. at 1291. 
 15 
exercise religion.
74
  In support of this finding, the court provided, “They [corporations] do not 
pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivates actions separate and apart 
from the intention and direction of their individuals actors.”75  It followed that the plaintiff’s 
motion for an injunction was denied.
76
  Agreeing with the District Court’s findings, the Tenth 
Circuit denied the plaintiff’s motion for injunction, and Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
also denied plaintiff’s application for injunction, noting that the success of Hobby Lobby’s 
claims was not clear.
77
   
 Because the United States Courts of Appeals have not yet reached the merits of any of the 
challenges against the Provision, district courts are facing complex decisions about what to 
follow as precedent and are reaching different conclusions.  For example, the outcome American 
Pulverizer case was and continues to be influenced by the O’Brien case.78  The Western District 
of Missouri reached a different outcome than the district courts in the above cases, in part 
because of the influence of the Eight Circuit in granting a stay pending appeal to O’Brien.79  The 
plaintiffs in American Pulverizer identify as Evangelical Christians and challenged the Provision 
as being inconsistent with their religious beliefs and claimed compliance with the Provision 
would violate RFRA.
80
   
Noting the facts as similar to O’Brien, the court found plaintiffs would incur an injury 
without an injunction, the injury to plaintiffs would outweigh the injury to the public interest 
                                            
74
 Id. at 1291. 
75
 Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d, at 1291. 
76
 Id. at 1297. 
77
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (2012). 
78
 Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-3459-CV-S-RED, 2012 
WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012). 
79
 Id. at *1 (After a phone conference with the Eight Circuit, the District Court found “ the Court 
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resulting in the denial of an injunction, and that Plaintiff’s RFRA claims require a deliberate 
investigation.
81
  Because of these factors, combined with influence of the O’Brien stay, the court 
found “ that the balance of equities top strongly in favor of injunctive relief in this case and that 
Plaintiffs have raised questions concerning their likelihood of success on the merits that are so 
serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate investigation.”82  This demonstrates how, 
because of difference in analysis or review, district courts are reaching different conclusions for 
very similar challenges.  This paper find the courts denying preliminary injunctions to be correct 
because of their analysis on Free Exercise and RFRA claims. 
 
Analysis 
 As the cases above illustrate, much of the debate about whether or not for-profit 
corporations should be able to succeed on Free Exercise and First Amendment claims depends 
on whether or not a corporation has the ability to exercise religion.  Employers in the above cases 
cited Citizens United as a reason to assert the validity of their corporation’s religious liberty, but 
does Citizens United really mean that individuals can extend religious views to their corporation? 
It is true that some First Amendment protections apply to private corporations, but as described 
by the above case law, corporations do not enjoy all First Amendment protections, and the 
difference comes to down to whether or not the protection is considered purely personal or not.
83
   
Additionally, it is important to analyze how a corporation gains a religious identity and 
whether or not it automatically reflects its owners’ respective religious beliefs.  Perhaps the 
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corporation’s mission statement should be taken into account or whether or not the corporation 
participates in any kind of religiously-based charity work or establishes a religiously-based 
foundation.  The requirements for how a for-profit corporation adopts religious beliefs remain 
unclear.  In contrast, there are clearer processes for non-profits wishing to claim a religious 
identity for special treatment or certain exemptions from federal and state law.  For example, a 
church is granted a federal tax exemption if it qualifies under IRC 501(c)(3) as being “organized 
and operated exclusively for religious … purposes …no part of the net earnings of which inures 
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual …” and does not participate in certain 
political activity.
84
  When considering the tax-exempt status of an entity incorporating as a 
religious organization, including religiously-affiliated non-profits, the IRS examines factors such 
as contribution to private interest and individuals.
85
 
 The current healthcare system already gives employers, as an aggregate, a powerful 
position in the marketplace which greatly impacts people who obtain health insurance through 
their employer.
86
  Employers act as an agent of healthcare provider for their employees, meaning 
employers take the role of choosing and purchasing the insurance plans on behalf of their 
employees, who are in the role of principle.
87
  This agency relationship has some cost and 
bargaining benefits and in theory means the employer is acting in the best interest of the 
employee as its agent.
88
  However, it also means that much of the decision-making in the 
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healthcare coverage process comes not from the employees themselves but from the employer.
89
  
Discussing the possibility of giving employers more power to shape the healthcare choices of 
their employees must necessarily be in the context of the amount of control employers already 
maintain because of their agency relationship with their employees. 
 Interpreting law as giving corporations the ability to express religious belief and practice 
could open the door to employers gaining even more control over the lives of their employees 
than they already have.  For-profit corporations, in their aggregate, have a powerful position in 
the marketplace and can use that position to decide how to treat their employees.  For one, if for-
profit employers gained the ability to claim an exemption from the provision, it would, 
“substantially undermine the government’s compelling goals due to the very large numbers of 
employees who would be denied contraception coverage by such an exemption.”90 
 Additionally, there are valid concerns about giving corporations the power to 
discriminate based on religion if those corporations are in the position to enforce certain religious 
beliefs over others.  The American Constitution Society, a legal organization that promotes 
constitutional values, provides; “Federal laws prohibiting religious discrimination in employment 
incorporate national values that condemn an employers use of the economic leverage of current 
or prospective employment to penalize employers for their religious practices or to compel them 
involuntarily to conform to the religious practice of other.”91  When employers attempt to control 
the healthcare choices their employees can and cannot make based on religious beliefs, it appears 
identical to imposing their religious practices on their employees.   
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 Restricting healthcare choices in regards to access to preventative services in this manner, 
especially given the large economic impact of for-profit corporations, is a form a social control, 
and it impacts women in a much more direct way than men.
92
  Further, it inherently places more 
value on certain religious beliefs than others.  As noted by the ACLU, showing preference for 
one religious belief over another is contrary to our country’s values; “Religious freedom means 
everyone is entitled to their religious beliefs.  We neither rank the legitimacy of those beliefs, nor 
allow them to be used a license to discriminate or harm others.  Dismantling the contraception 
rule would violate these principles.”93  By choosing to value certain religious beliefs over others 
in the context of employment, the government would be communicating the message not only 
that religious beliefs have inherently different value, but that it is also permissible for employers 
to control which religious beliefs carry more weight than others.   
 Instead, the government should promote the principle of religious equality by disallowing 
for-profit corporations from claiming a religious exemption from the Provision.
94
  First, the 
Constitution already contains robust religious protections including the protection of prayer and 
preaching under the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  
These protections are reflected in the exemptions and options for religious institutions that are 
already available such as the grandfathered plan provision, the options of a third-party insurer,  
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and the option to terminate coverage altogether.
95
  Additionally, when discussing the equality 
concerns that are incident to Free Exercise analysis, William Marshall, professor of law at the 
University of North Carolina School of Law, stated, “ a constitutional preference for religious 
belief cuts at the heart of the central principle of the Free Speech Clause-that every idea is of 
equal dignity and status in the marketplace.” 96  Not only would belief preference 
disproportionately favor majority religious beliefs and religious beliefs in general over other 
belief structures, it would create an alarming slippery slope of exemptions.
97
  Considering the 
United States is a nation of vastly different, diverse religious traditions and belief systems, it 
would be virtually impossible to accommodate everyone and would necessarily involve valuing 
certain beliefs over others.
98
 
If employers are allowed the ability to choose which religious beliefs should be valued 
above others, it will put them in the position to be able influence their employees’ choices and 
favor certain employees over others.  Employers’ influence could be used to select employee or 
even coerce employees into values and beliefs that reflect their employer’s values and beliefs.  
By entering into the marketplace as a secular, for-profit corporation, these employers have 
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subjected themselves to certain constraints including employment discrimination laws.
99
  It 
follows that exempting for-profit corporations from the provision, “would enable the use of 
employment to encourage and even to compel involuntary employee conformance with the 
employer’s religious practices,” and, “would fundamentally distort employment markets in favor 
of religious employers.”100  This economic effect would parallel and exacerbate the existing 
impact of employees seeking out certain jobs solely for access to health insurance in general.
101
  
Thus, exempting for-profits from the provision requirements would, in effect, go against 
employment discrimination laws while having a great impact on the large economic pull for-
profit corporations have in the marketplace. 
 Giving the power to employers to enforce values of ranking religious belief also has 
negative implications for the government and superseding the role of the government.  Some so-
called narrower solutions that have been proposed as an alternative to the provision include 
requiring the government to pay for services to which employers have religious objections, such 
as certain contraceptives.
102
  Further, as noted by the American Constitution Society, “a religious 
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person’s right to an exemption does not include the right to demand that the government for the 
exemption.”103 
 Even if employers could establish that their corporations had the ability to exercise 
religion, they would also have to overcome the compelling government interest in women’s 
healthcare as required by both the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA
104
.  As described above, 
RFRA was enacted partially because interest groups felt it had become too easy for the 
government to override religious liberties by declaring advancement of a government interest.
105
  
However, the government has a very strong argument in regards to its interests in expanding 
access to women’s preventative healthcare because the Provision aims to promote equality.106  
One of the strongest arguments for the government is the fact that the vast majority of women 
will use contraception at some point during their lives.
107
  Since women make up over half the 
population in the United States, it follows that contraception access impacts a large proportion of 
the over 315 million people in the country.
108
 
 In addition to looking at the numbers of contraceptive users in the United States, it is 
important to consider how preventative healthcare access affects different segments of the 
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population, especially when it comes to disproportionately negative impacts.  One of the goals of 
the ACA is to alleviate healthcare disparities, and the Provision plays a large role in this effort.
109
  
First, access to preventative healthcare impacts people differently based on their gender.  This is 
partially because economic disparities associated with spending on reproductive health; when 
looking at similar insurance policies for people who are the same age, women are likely to spend 
significantly more in out-of-pocket costs than men as a result of paying for preventative 
healthcare.
110
  Consequently, insurance companies are also charging women more than men for 
coverage because of their different preventative healthcare needs.
111
   
 Women are also economically impacted because of the implications reproductive health 
access has on their ability to earn wages and succeed in careers, factors having a large impact on 
women’s ability to achieve equality.  Research indicates that access to family planning greatly 
influences women’s choices when it comes to careers and advanced education resulting in 
greater access correlating with higher wages for women.
112
  Quoting one of the most important 
Supreme Court decisions on reproductive health, the ACLU notes; “The ability of women to 
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their 
ability to control their reproductive lives.”113   Giving more women the opportunity to choose  
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their economic path promotes the government’s goal of working for gender equality.114 
 Additionally, the Provision will help alleviate health disparities between men and 
women.  Increased access to preventative health helps reduce the rates of unintended pregnancy; 
unintended pregnancies have long-term health effects for women and their unborn children.
115
  In 
his comment in the University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class, 
Chad Brooker states “women with unintended pregnancies are more likely than those with 
intended pregnancies to receive later or not prenatal care, to smoke and consume alcohol during 
pregnancy, and to experience domestic violence during pregnancy.” 116   While conservative 
lawmakers and policymakers may attribute these disparities to lifestyle choices, research 
supports the finding that disparities are largely a result of unequal access to preventative health 
services and that women who cannot access preventative health services may not immediately 
realize they are pregnant, resulting in higher rates of risky behavior.
117
  The realities of the 
negative consequences for women resulting from health access barriers emphasize the need for 
the Provision because it seeks to expand access to preventative health services. 
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According to the Guttmacher Institute, increased contraceptive use has been 
found to be responsible for 77% of the decline in pregnancies amount 15 to 17-
year-olds between 1995 and 2002, and for the entire decline among 18 to 19-year-
olds over the same period.  Increased access to contraception among publicly 
funded programs alone accounted for the *175 the avoidance of 1.94 million 
unintended pregnancies in 2006.  The public funding of these services has been 
particularly effect among poor populations where the access to contraception has 
reduced the number of unintended pregnancies by half. 
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 In addition to general gender disparities, there are also measureable disparities amongst 
women based on ethnicity, race, and socioeconomic income level.
118
  While unintended 
pregnancies generally decreased between 2001-2006, the decrease occurred largely within 
groups of high-income women as opposed to low-income women and women of color who saw 
an increase in the rate of unintended pregnancy.
119
  Because low-income women and women of 
color are often marginalized in other ways and may be less able to access other necessary health 
resources, it follows that the government has an interest in increasing access to preventative 
health services for these groups. The Provision aims to alleviate race, gender, and class 
disparities; The Department of Health and Human Services noted the government interests 
asserted in the Provision, “including better treatment of conditions unrelated to pregnancy for 
which contraceptives are often prescribed, improvement of the health of pregnant women and 
newborn children, reduction in the cost of employer-sponsored health care plans, reduction in 
workplace inequalities between men and women, and reduction in the disparate health care costs 
borne by men and women.”120  
In the context of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA, the compelling government interest 
plays an important role, but it is not absolutely controlling.  As discussed previously, a 
corporation’s ability to practice religious exercise is not clearly established, but if, 
hypothetically, a corporation could exercise the same religion as its onwers, further analysis of 
the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA also supports the finding that for-profit corporations should 
be compelled to comply with the provision.  First, it is helpful to examine the neutrality and 
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general applicability of the Provision.  In the cases cited, the employers generally claim the 
provision infringes upon the corporation’s religious liberty because the owners cannot comply 
with the Provision without violating their religious beliefs.  While validity of the owners’ 
religious beliefs is not questioned, the American Constitution Society notes, “Free Exercise 
doctrine condemns only intentional religious discrimination, not religious burdens occurring as 
the incidental effect of a neutral and general law.”121  
Finding the general neutrality of a law is key in Free Exercise analysis.
122
  Looking strictly at 
the language of the Provision and the exemptions, it clearly applies to all for-profit employers 
equally; it does not specifically target any type of employer or target any particular religious 
belief.
123
 The current legal interpretation of this part of the application of the Free Exercise 
Clause is derived from Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith, where Scalia emphasized the difference 
between a law intentionally infringing on one’s religious beliefs and a law incidentally having a 
disproportionate impact on one’s religious beliefs; incidental disproportionate impact means that 
a law is only subject to the low standard of rational basis scrutiny.
124
  Richard F. Duncan, 
professor of law at University of Nebraska College of Law adds; “Under Smith and Lukumi, the 
majority may rule without any fear of religious anarchy, so long as the burdens it creates are not 
imposed selectively.”125 
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It is important to note why women’s preventative health is even being scrutinized, especially 
when compared to the history of regulating men’s reproductive health choices.  Women’s health 
has a history of being used as a wedge issue, a tool for leverage that is continuously surrendered 
as unimportant in legislative and policy disputes.
126
  Indeed, the issues of contraception coverage 
in the Provision have received the most attention of any issue in the ACA, and abortion coverage 
was off the table from almost the very beginning of the discussion.
127
  Groups of Catholic clergy 
members have been some of the most outspoken opponents of the Provision and have proven 
influential in the accommodation discussions.
128
   
The strong influence of religious clergy not only harms women’s health, it contributes to the 
perpetuation of religious belief taking precedence over strong scientific evidence.
129
  Religious 
belief overcoming scientific evidence is particularly relevant in the context of emergency 
contraception, which has been described as an abortifacient despite strong scientific evidence 
that emergency contraception only prevents pregnancy and does not cause a termination of an 
existing pregnancy.
130
  
To compare why this is notable, it is helpful to imagine this kind of treatment being given to 
another subject.  For example, similar to employees choosing how to use their health insurance 
coverage, employees also have control over how to spend their salaries in regards to their 
housing arrangements.  The ACLU notes, “ it would be hard to argue that there is a great burden 
on an employer’s religion if an employee uses her salary to pay for an apartment where she 
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cohabitates unmarried with her boyfriend, contrary to her employer’s religious beliefs.”131  Yet, 
aspects other than reproductive health choices of employees’ personal lives are not given the 
same kind of attention and scrutiny. 
 Women’s contraceptives were not always considered a basic part of health insurance 
coverage.  However, this began to change during the women’s reproductive health movement, 
which has its origins questioning the physician-patient relationship and advocating for more 
autonomy for women making choices about their healthcare decisions.
132
  Demands for 
insurance coverage increased in response to Viagra becoming a covered prescription, shortly 
after its development.
133
  Prior to the enactment of the ACA, twenty-six states already mandated 
that for-profit employers include contraceptive coverage in their group health insurance plans.
134
  
Notable cases in California and New York illustrate how courts approached claims of religious 
liberty violation from mandated contraceptive coverage.
135
 
Recommendations 
 This paper advocates against for-profit corporations being able to claim an exemption to 
the Provision based on Free Exercise, RFRA, or any other claims.  The district courts denying 
preliminary injunctions, in their initial analysis of the merits, have the correct interpretation.  
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When courts reach the merits of these cases, they should deny plaintiff’s relief from the 
compliance with the Provision.  This paper would advocate for the elimination of all exemptions 
and accommodations to the Provision, but if any exemptions and accommodations are going to 
be finalized, they should not include for-profit corporations. 
The flood of litigation stemming from the Provision reflects problems with attitudes about 
women’s healthcare.  Women’s preventative healthcare, especially when it involves reproductive 
choices, is a constant source of controversy even decades after birth control and abortion were 
widely legalized. Several reasons may exist as to why women’s reproductive health is always 
being debated.  Even as other social issues progress and society continues to accept changes, 
contraception and abortion are under continuous attack by legislators and conservative 
lobbyists.
136
  Consequently, one solution would be to address the philosophical and ideological 
origins of the views that advocate for restrictions on women’s preventative health, and to try to 
unravel the systemic sexism that exists in regards women’s health status.   
Women’s health is too valuable to continue to be used as a political tool.  Authors Nancy 
Levit, professor of Law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, and Robert 
R.M. Verchick, professor of law at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, address the 
value of women’s reproductive health in their book Feminist Legal Theory.137  Discussing the 
impact of reproductive health, the authors stated “Yet women’s ability to control their 
reproductive lives is about much more than whether they choose to have children.  Reproductive 
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liberty is connected to all other aspects of women’s equality—the ability to hold a job, obtain an 
education, participate in sports, or escape gender-based violence from spouses …”138 
Women’s health should not be subject to scrutiny based on the religious beliefs of others.  
The government should make a point that women’s health, in the context of federal law, must 
take precedence over religious belief.  By valuing health for all people, the government acts in 
the best interest of all citizens no matter their religious beliefs and preserves the right for private 
citizens to practice their own religious beliefs in their private lives without imposing those 
beliefs on others who may or may not share them.  By no means does this position advocate in 
any way for the control of religious beliefs in one’s private capacity, it is simply advocating for 
those religious beliefs to not trump women’s health in government.  It is vitally important to 
separate the role of religion in one’s private life from the role of religion in government.    
Another solution would be to reexamine the way healthcare is provided in the United States.  
While it is true that the ACA provides significant progress in that it will cover millions of the 
previously uninsured population, it still is based off a mostly competitive, private market for 
health insurance, funneled through employers. This means that healthcare is still largely 
dependent on the agency relationship between employee and employer.  In this dependent 
relationship, it becomes possible for employers to control the healthcare choices and healthcare 
access of their employees.  In the long-term, it would be helpful to solve these seemingly endless 
disputes about the kinds of healthcare women deserve by transition to a single, universal payer 
for healthcare or at least a more centralized source that could not restrict a woman’s healthcare 
choices based on religious beliefs or disagreements with so-called “lifestyle choices.”   
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Conclusion 
 The enactment of the ACA represents a huge step forward for expanding access to the 
health coverage in the United States.  It was a victory for the public as a whole and for women’s 
rights when the Provision was added to the ACA.  Expanding contraception access and breaking 
down barriers of cost will have positive, life-changing effects for women and their families.  
While the United States has a valuable cultural and legal tradition of protecting religious 
freedoms, that tradition cannot continue by imposing religious beliefs on others.  The Provision 
does not threaten one’s ability to exercise religion under the Free Exercise Claus or RFRA.   
Further, exercise of religion is not automatically extended from an individual to that 
individual’s for-profit corporation.  Even if courts could somehow find a burden on religion 
caused by the generally applicable Provision, that burden must be outweighed by the 
government’s interest in women’s health.  It would set an extremely dangerous precedent for 
women and other marginalized groups if courts turned their backs on women’s health and held in 
favor of for-profit corporations challenging the Provision.  For-profit corporations must comply 
with the Provision and should not be granted an exemption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
